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Abstract. Key agreement is a fundamental cryptographic primitive. It
has been proved that key agreement protocols with security against com-
putationally unbounded adversaries cannot exist in a setting where Alice
and Bob do not have dependent variables and communication between
them is fully public, or fully controlled by the adversary. In this pa-
per we consider this problem when the adversary can “partially” control
the channel. We motivate these adversaries by considering adversarial
corruptions at the physical layer of communication, give a definition of
adversaries that can “partially” eavesdrop and “partially” corrupt the
communication. We formalize security and reliability of key agreement
protocols, derive bounds on the rate of key agreement, and give con-
structions that achieve the bound. Our results show that it is possible to
have secret key agreement as long as some of the communicated symbols
remain private and unchanged by the adversary. We relate our results to
the previous known results, and discuss future work.
Key words: Wiretap Channel, Active Adversary, Key Agreement, Secure Mes-
sage Transmission, Physical Layer Security, Information Theoretic Security.
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental problems in cryptography is establishing a shared se-
cret key between two parties. The problem has been studied in different settings.
Important distinctions among settings are based on, (i) the adversary’s computa-
tional power, (ii) if communicants have access to a public authenticated channel,
or if the communication is over tamperable channel, and, (iii) if there are initial
shared information, possibly in the form of dependent random variables.
We consider key agreement with security against computationally unlimited
adversaries. Information theoretic key agreement was first considered by Maurer
[25,26] with the motivation of providing positive results for scenarios that secure
communication, with security against a computationally unlimited adversary,
had been proved to be impossible. The two main approaches to securely sending
a message over a channel that is eavesdropped by an unlimited adversary are
due to Shannon [34] who formalized the notion of perfect secrecy when Alice
and Bob are connected by a public reliable channel, and second, Wyner [43] who
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introduced wiretap model in which communicants use the noise in the channel to
provide prefect secrecy for the communication without requiring a shared secret
key. Security guarantee in both these models although strong, is only achievable
under very restrictive assumptions. Perfect secrecy in Shannon’s model requires
communicants to share a secret key of the length at least the size of the message.
Secure communication in wiretap setting is only possible if Eve’s view of the
codeword is “noisier” than the Bob’s view of the codeword, which does not hold
for settings that the eavesdropper is closer to Alice than Bob, and has a better
communication channel to Alice. Thus positive result in both above approaches
are under conditions that are of limited practical applications.
Motivated by this observation, Maurer considered the more basic problem
of secret key agreement (secure communication is possible, if one can have a
shared key) where Alice and Bob want to share a secret key while the commu-
nication channel between them is eavesdropped by a computationally unlimited
adversary. Maurer considered a minimum setting where Alice, Bob and Eve hold
dependent variables X, Y and Z, with a joint distribution PXY Z , and Alice and
Bob can interact over a public discussion (PD) channel: an authenticated chan-
nel that is fully visible by all system participants. The setting is “minimum”
in the sense that it was proved [26] that without any initial joint distribution,
secure key agreement is impossible. The joint partially leaked distribution PXY Z
is the only resource of Alice and Bob, and so a basic question is when a secure
shared key can be derived by interacting over the PD. The joint distribution can
be generated by receiving transmission of a public random beacon (e.g broad-
cast by a satellite) that broadcasts samples of a random variable, and this is
received by all parties over their individual channels. The distribution can also
be simply generated by Alice sending a random string Xn of length n to Bob,
over a discrete memoryless wiretapped channel, resulting in Y n and Zn, at Bob
and Eve respectively.
Maurer showed that interaction over PD in the above setting is indeed pow-
erful, and could result in a shared random key and hence secure communication,
when Shannon and Wyner models give negative results.
Maurer [23] later considered the case that no PD is available, and com-
munications are over a tamperable channel. The adversary in this setting can
completely control the communication and modify or drop the sent messages.
Intuitively when the adversary is computationally unbounded and fully controls
the communication channel, one cannot expect any secure key to be established.
Maurer proved that without initial correlated variables, this is indeed the case
even if extra restrictions (e.g. secure channel in one direction) are placed on the
adversary. He also proved existential results for the case that PXY Z exists.
The works [27,31,20,11] all consider this powerful model of adversary, corre-
sponding to Dovel-Yao model of adversary that is applicable in networks [13]. To
enable establishment of shared key however, authors assume strongly correlated
variables, in particular identical [31] or “close” secrets [20,11], that are partially
leaked. The role of interaction in these settings is “reconciliation” that results
in a shared secret (in the case of close secrets), and privacy amplification that
[31,3] extracts the randomness in the shared variable.
In this paper we consider a setting where no dependent variables is held by
Alice and Bob. Maurer showed impossibility of key agreement when there is no
shared correlated variables, and the adversary can either completely eavesdrop
the communication channel, or fully control the channel. We ask if positive
results could be obtained when the adversary “partially” sees and “partially”
controls the channel.
Adversaries with partial access to the channel can be naturally defined at the
lowest layer of OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) protocol stack, known as the
physical layer. This is the same OSI layer that is used in the Wyner wiretap
model where partial view of the adversary (due to noise in Eve’s channel) is used
to provide secure communication. Here we consider adversaries with partial view
of the message and partial tampering ability.
Information units at the physical layer of communication correspond to el-
ements of a q-ary alphabet [14,17,18,19,34]. The goal of encoding at this layer
traditionally is to provide reliability against channel noise. We consider the case
that these units (channel symbols) can be individually accessed, changed, or
blocked by a jamming adversary. In practice, an adversary with a transceiver,
depending on their location and transceiver capability, can intercept some of the
transmiited symbols, and/or add adversarial noise to corrupt them. An adver-
sary with full control of all communicated symbols corresponds to the network
layer adversary in [23] and the follow up works (same as Dolev-Yao model). By
moving to physical layer, we are able to consider adversaries with different lev-
els of control over the communicated messages, and study the key agreement
problem against a more refined classes of adversaries, that capture corruption
at physical layers of communication.
1.1 Our work
We initiate cryptographic study of key agreement problem in presence of physical
layer adversaries, and show positive results when key agreement in presence of
network layer full eavesdropping and/or corrupting adversaries, is impossible.
We consider key agreement problem between Alice and Bob who are con-
nected by a channel that is partially controlled by Eve, and the partially con-
trolled communication is their only resource.
Alice and Bob send messages back and forth, over the channel. We define the
partial control of Eve by their ability to select, (i) a subset Sr of the transmitted
components for eavesdropping, and (ii) a subset Sw of transmitted components,
to corrupt by adding (jamming) a noise vector. The two sets are chosen adap-
tively in each round and may have overlap. We impose the restriction that in
each round, |Sr| ≤ ρrn and |Sw| ≤ ρwn, where n is the length of transcript in
that round, and ρr and ρw are fixed constants in the range [0, 1], specifying the
adversaries capabilities. A network layer adversary corresponds to ρr = ρw = 1,
and a perfectly secure authenticated channel corresponds to ρr = ρw = 0.
Parameters ρr and ρw model wireless adversaries’ limitation of receiving
antenna and receiver, and jamming capability, respectively. As experimentally
shown in [30], because of the constraints of real systems and channels, making a
deterministic change to an individual transmitted symbol is “hard”, if possible
at all. Assuming additive noise captures the uncertain effect of corruption on the
transmitted symbol. We do not consider an adversary with unlimited jamming
power; such adversaries can always completely disrupt the communication. Our
adversary has a fixed eavesdropping and corruption budget in each round. A
stronger adversary is when the adversary has a total budget for the whole pro-
tocol, and can plan how to spend it in different round with the restriction that,∑
i |Sir| ≤ ρrn and
∑
i |Siw| ≤ ρwn. We start with the less demanding case that
the budget of each round is fixed. This is also the more realistic case as the par-
tial view of the adversary in most cases is due to limitations of the adversary’s
hardware and processing capabilities.
We also consider a third parameter, ρ = |Sr∪Sw|n which is the fraction of
transmitted symbols that are either leaked or corrupted.
Models and definition. We define a (ρr, ρw)-channel, and use the definition of
(interactive) key agreement protocol in [25,23], replacing the PD with (ρr, ρw)-
channels. The protocol proceeds in rounds, in each Alice or Bob sends a message.
At the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob output keys KA and KB , respectively.
The security properties of a secure key agreement protocol are as follows.
– Strong reliability: The probability that Alice and Bob do not derive the same
key satisfy, P(KA 6= KB) ≤ δ;
– Security: The generated key is private, given Eve’s view of the communica-
tion;
– Randomness. The generated key is statistically close to uniform distribution.
Defining reliability in information theoretic key agreement, when adversary
tampers with the communication, is subtle. Maurer [23] and the follow up work
[20], consider the case that at the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob either
output a key, or ⊥. That is they either output a key, or declare the protocol
unsuccessful. The protocol is successful when at least one of the communicants
output ⊥ (and so guaranteeing that a shared leaked key will not be established)
or, a secret shared key is established. Using this definition, a protocol may have
negligible failure probability but at that same time in most cases no shared
secret key be established. This is a natural definition considering a network layer
adversary that completely controls the communication.
Our definition of strong reliability is the same as in [26,23] where communi-
cation is over PD and the adversary is passive. In such setting (initial PXY Z and
communication over PD) Alice and Bob may output different keys because of
the working of the protocol and properties of the functions that are used for the
derivation of the key, and not because of corruption by the channel adversary.
A surprising result of our work is that by slightly reducing the control of the
adversary on the channel (ρr and ρw can be close to 1), one can expect strong
reliability in presence of corrupted communication.
Definition of secrecy and key randomness is by requiring that the distribution
of secret key given Eve’s observation K|Z, is statistically close to a uniformly
distributed variable U which is of the same length as K.
Rate and impossibility results. Following [23], we define the secret key rate of a
protocol as the rate that Alice and Bob agree on a shared key, while Eve’s total
information remains bounded by . The rate is given by R = log |K|n log |Σ| , where Σ
is the channel alphabet (symbols sent over the channel).
We prove,
R ≤ 1− ρ.
The bound effectively shows that the fraction of symbols that are either
eavesdropped or tampered with in each round, cannot contribute to the secret
key. This is intuitively expected and the proof shows that interaction cannot
overcome this restriction.
In this definition of rate, all communicated symbols contribute to the com-
munication cost. In the definition of rate in [25,23] however, communication over
public channel is free and the rate only considers the number of shared triplets
(X,Y, Z) used by the protocol. When PXnY nZn is the result of Alice sending
Xn to Bob over a wiretap channel, only the cost of this communication (over
physical layer) is considered in the calculation of rate. The communication over
the PD is for reconciliation and extraction, and are considered free.
The bound shows impossibility of secure key agreement when ρ > 1.
The above bound is derived for key agreement protocols assuming strong re-
liability. The bound also holds for AWTP-PD channel under the same condition.
In Section 3 we derive the upper bound
R ≤ 1− ρr
on the secret key rate of key agreement protocols under weak reliability condi-
tion. The same bound holds for key agreement over AWTP-PD channels also.
Maurer’s bound R ≤ max(I(Xn, Y n), I(Xn, Y n|Zn)) [23], can be written as
R ≤ 1− ρ because max(I(Xn, Y n), I(Xn, Y n|Zn)) = 1− ρ. Note that the rate in
Maurer’s bound does not consider communication over PD, while in our setting
the rate includes all the communication.
Using weak reliability, the bound on the secret key rate is RSK ≤ 1−ρr. Note
that in our setting the shared dependent variables X,Y, Z are influenced by
Eve through the choices of Sr and Sw and the added noise. Although Maurer’s
general setting [26] allows for the distribution P (X,Y, Z) to be adversarially
influenced, but in the case of multiple instances of triplets (X,Y, Z) received
through noisy channels from a single randomness source, they are not influenced
by the adversary.
Constructions. We give two constructions of secure key agreement protocols,
with strong and weak reliability.
The first construction is an efficient three round protocol that achieves the
rate 1 − ρ when ρr + 2ρw < 1 − ρ when strong reliability is considered. The
second protocol is an efficient one round protocol that achieves the rate 1− ρr,
but only for weak reliability. Both protocols have constant size alphabet.
1.2 Motivation and applications
Considering adversaries at physical layer of communication gives a realistic
model of adversaries in wireless communication systems, evidenced by grow-
ing research in physical layer security [1,5,28,30] in recent years. This research
however has been primarily in networking and engineering communities with
emphasis on tools and techniques, such as modulation techniques, multiple in-
put, multiple output antennas [38,29,4] and signal design, to achieve security
goals that is “informally” stated.
Our adversary model is motivated by physical layer adversaries in wireless
communication, where entities interact with its neighbour over a channel that
can be “partially controlled” by the adversary. However our formulation of the
problem can also be used to model networks that are partially controlled by
an adversary. The network between Alice and Bob can be modelled by node
disjoint paths between them. The adversary selects two subsets of paths (possibly
overlapping), some for eavesdropping and some for tampering. The goal is to for
Alice and Bob to share a secret key. A similar model of network is considered
in SMT [12,16,15,21] problem. In its full generality and when Sr 6= Sw, the
tampering is algebraic and by adding a noise vector on the set Sw. However
for Sr = Sw (and more generally any component that is both read and written
to), the tampering will be arbitrary as Eve can determine the noise component
zi = x
2
i−x1i , where x2i and x1i are the new and old (read) value of the component.
Using physical layer properties of the system for secure communication has
the interesting intuition that massive surveillance would translate to the require-
ment of everywhere physical presence which would significantly raise the bar for
successful surveillance. This paper effectively shows that under the reasonable
assumption that adversary cannot fully access the physical layer communication
system (channel or network), Alice and Bob can generate shared randomness,
with provable security against a computationally unlimited adversary, and are
able to securely communicate. This provides an interesting new research direc-
tion for using physical layer security as a source of individualization and diver-
sification in security systems with the goal of improved security against massive
surveillance. A well-known approach to increasing security against massive blan-
ket attacks in computer systems is using diversification and individualization of
software and hardware systems. Diversification has been successfully used by
computer virus writers to avoid detection by making each copy distinct [37]. It
has also been used by security system designers, for example by using multiple
operating systems and protection software, to protect against mass infections. In
cryptography, massive surveillance through techniques such as algorithm substi-
tution and backdoors, has motivated new research [44,2]. An important source
of diversity in secure communication is physical layer properties of the commu-
nication systems. To thwart systems that use physical layer properties of the
system as a resource, the adversary must exert higher level of control over the
physically environment which would be significantly more intrusive, visible and
demanding on the adversary. Our work is an step in this direction of exploring
this resource for security against massive surveillance.
1.3 Relation to previous work
Maurer [25] considered a setup where Alice, Bob and Eve have correlated vari-
ables X, Y , and Z, distributed as PXY Z . Alice and Bob want to share a shared
secret key by exchanging messages over an authenticated insecure channel that
is fully readable by the adversary. He derived an upperbound on the entropy of
the key that can be obtained from such a protocol,
H(K) ≤ min{I(X;Y ), I(X : Y |Z)}+ H(K,K ′) + I(K;CtZ) (1)
To obtain more concrete results, he considered a scenario where a discrete
memoryless channel generates sequences Xn = (X1 · · ·Xn), Y n = (Y1 · · ·Yn),
and Zn = (Z1 · · ·Zn). In such a setting, rate of secret key agreement is intro-
duced [25]. This is the maximum rate at which Alice and Bob can agree on a
secret key, while the rate at which Eve obtains information is arbitrarily small.
This definition was later [23] strengthened by requiring that the total leakage of
the key approaches zero, when the communication length n over the channel ap-
proaches infinity. They extend a lower bound on the rate of secret key agreement
in [23] to the key rate with strong secrecy. The bound states,
R ≥ I(X;Y )−min{I(Z;X), I(Z;Y )} (2)
In this model communication over public discussion channel is assumed free.
NOT Authenticated channels. In [23] Maurer removed the assumption that
the channel connecting Alice and Bob is authenticated. He allowed the adversary
to be able to control this channel and completely control the messages that are
sent over it. The goal of the protocol is to establish a shared key that is per-
fectly unknown to the adversary. This means that this goal could be achieved
while some tampered communication remains undetected. Maurer considered
two cases: (1). Alice, Bob and Eve do not share the initial information. (2). Al-
ice, Bob and Eve share the initial information X,Y, Z with distribution PXY Z .
Theorem 1 [23] shows that in case (1) no secret key can be established. This in-
tuitively says that if there is no initial common randomness and communications
are completely tamperable, then no secret shared key can be expected. The the-
orem further shows impossibility of key agreement even when all messages are
authenticated (but public), or communication is authentic in one direction, and
secret in the opposite direction. So without initial shared randomness, even if no
tampering and only one direction visible by the adversary, one cannot expect a
shared secret key. Thus initial setup is necessary for any information theoretic
secret key agreement protocol.
Maurer defines X-simulatable (Y -simulatable) and shows impossibility of key
agreement if PXY Z is X-simulatable (Y -simulatable). When the triplet X
n, Y n,
and Zn is generated by many applications of the same experiment, the secret
key rate S∗(PXY Z) can be defined. A surprising result of the paper is that
S∗(PXY Z) = 0, or S∗(PXY Z) = S(PXY Z), and this distinction is based on or
PXY Z is X-simulatable (or Y -simulatable ) or not.
That is if PXY Z is notX-simulatable (Y -simulatable), using non-authenticated
communication gives the same rate as using authenticated communication.
(ρr, ρw)-Correlation. To compare our results with the above models, we con-
sider a distribution PXnY nZn that is generated by Alice sendingX
n = (X1 · · ·Xn)
over a (ρr, ρw)-channel to Bob. Here Y
n and Zn denote the observations of Bob
and Eve, under the restrictions imposed by the channel. We refer to such cor-
related variables, as (ρr, ρw)-triplet of length n. Maurer notes [23] “In general
the distribution PXY Z may be under Eve partial control, and may only partly
be known to Alice and Bob.” (ρr, ρw)-correlation generates PXY Z under the
influence of Eve.
We consider this initial correlation in, (i) Maurer’s setting of [25] where com-
munication is over a PD, and (ii) Maurer setting of [23] where the channel is fully
controlled by the adversary. In (ρr, ρw)-correlation in setting of [25], PXnY nZn
is a (ρr, ρw)-correlation of length n, with interaction over PD and using strong
reliability definition. Maurer upper bound for a key agreement protocol with
security I(K;Z) ≤  and reliability bounds δ is,
H(S) ≤ min{I(X;Y ), I(X : Y |Z)}+ h() + (|S| − 1).
The key rate of a protocol in Maurer’s setting however only considers the
number n of instances of the triplets (X,Y, Z) shared by parties, and assumes
free communication over public channel. That is the rate in fact is the expected
amount of entropy that can be derived from each instance.
The secret key in our setting however is the result of interaction over a par-
tially observed channel, and takes the total number of channel uses into account.
The two bounds give the same result. A partially adversarially controlled
channel can be used to generate secret keys at the same rate as key agreement
protocols in a setting of initially shared dependent vector variables, and having
access to a PD channel. This means that the requirement of the existence of
PD can be replaced with channels that are partially controlled by the adversary,
without incurring rate loss.
(ρr, ρw)-correlation in setting of [23]. Again PXnY nZn is (ρr, ρw)-correlation,
with interaction over a network layer adversary, and using weak definition of
reliability. The question that one can ask is, if the distribution PXnY nZn is X-
simulatable (Y -simulatable),
Adversary model. The adversarial model for physical layer adversaries was
first proposed in [40]. The goal of the protocol however was to provide reli-
able communication. Secure communication using the same adversary model was
studied in [41,39]. We use the same adversary model and refer to it as (ρr, ρw)-
Adversarial Wiretap Channel ((ρr, ρw)-AWTP). A secure message transmission
protocol can be used to send a random key and establish a shared key. The se-
crecy and reliability definition in [41,39] ensure that the received random string
satisfies security properties of definition 3 and so can be used as a key. It was
proved that the secrecy rate RM of a message transmission protocol (the highest
number of bits per channel use, where transmission has perfect secrecy and reli-
ability approaches perfect reliability with increased message length) is bounded
by RM ≤ 1−ρr−ρw. This means that no secure message transmission is possible
if ρr = ρw = 0.5, that is Sr and Sw are chosen each to be half of the codeword,
even if Sr = Sw and half of the components of each round are left untouched.
The results of this paper shows that secure communication is possible if Sr = Sw
and each set is as large as (1− ν)n, where ν is a negligible constant.
The adversary corrupts the codeword by adding a noise vector, with non-zero
element over Sw, to the codeword. If the adversary chooses Sr = Sw, then they
know the component that is corrupted (because it is in Sr) and so can design the
noise to change the component to any desired value. That is arbitrarily change
the component. Our work shows possibility of secure communication if (1− ν)n
components are arbitrarily corrupted.
Other works. Key agreement is a fundamental problem with a very large body
of research. Directly related work on secure key agreement can be grouped into
those that assume a shared partly leaked string [9,10,20,11] at the start, and
those that do not assume a shared string, but assume a close or highly correlated
variable [25,23,31,24,7]. In each group, communication can be over PD, or a
tamperable channel.
Renner et al. consider the general setting of key agreement protocol between
Alice and Bob with variables, X and Y , that are similar but not identical, while
Eve’s information about X and Y is incomplete, with communication over com-
pletely insecure channel. They find bound and propose a protocol. Kanukurthi
et al. [20] propose an efficient key agreement protocol in the same setting.
This problem has also been considered under robust fuzzy extractors [10] and
[9] for also the case that parties may have a long-term small secret key.
Extracting secret and shared randomness (key) when parties have weak, par-
tially leaked secret has been studied in [3]. Maurer et al. consider privacy am-
plification against passive and active adversaries with incomplete information
about a shared string between two parties.
Dodis et al.[11] give a two round protocol that optimally extracts the ran-
domness in a shared string of length n, by interacting over a channel that is
controlled by the adversary.
The work in [7] gives characterization of distributions PXY Z in different
communication setting such as when there is no communication, there is a one-
way communication and there is a helper.
2 Definitions of Key Agreement Protocol
2.1 Channel Models
Let n be the length of codeword, [n] = {1, · · · , n}. We denote set Sr = {i1, · · · , iρrn} ⊆
[n] and Sw = {j1, · · · , jρwn} ⊆ [n] be the two subsets of the n coordinates. Let
SUPP(x) of vector x ∈ Σn be the set of positions in which the component xi is
non-zero.
Definition 1. A ((ρr, ρw)-Adversarial Wiretap Channel((ρr, ρw)-AWTP)) is an
adversarially corrupted communication channel between Alice and Bob such that
it is (partially) controlled by an adversary Eve, with two capabilities: Reading
and Writing. For a codeword of length n, Eve can do the following:
1. Reading (eavesdropping): Adversary selects a subset Sr ⊆ [n] of size |Sr| ≤
ρrn and reads the components of the sent codeword c on S
r.
2. Writing (modifying): Adversary chooses a subset Sw ⊆ [n] of size |Sw| ≤ ρwn
for writing, and adds to c an error vector e with SUPP(e) = Sw.
For each channel, the subset S = Sr ∪ Sw with size |S| ≤ ρn is the set of
codeword components that are either read or write to, by the adversary. We
assume the adversary is adaptive and selects components of the codeword for
reading and writing one by one, using its current view of the communication, In
each communication round, the two subsets Sr and Sw, chosen by Eve, may be
different but will satisfy the bounds |Sr| ≤ ρrn, |Sw| ≤ ρwn and |S| ≤ ρn.
A key agreement protocol is an interactive protocol that uses the (ρr, ρw)-
AWTP channel is two directions, from Alice to Bob, or form Bob to Alice.
To compare our results with previous ones, we also consider public discussion
channels.
Definition 2. A (Public Discussion Channel(PD)) is an authenticated channel
between Alice and Bob, that can be read by everyone including Eve. The adver-
sary’s reading capability is Sr = [n], while the writing capability is Sw = 0.
2.2 Key Agreement Protocols
We study key agreement protocols over (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channels. We consider
the case that the channel is the only resource, and interaction over this channel
generates the key.
Interactive Key Agreement Protocols over (ρr, ρw)-AWTP
Channels.
There are a pair of forward and backward (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channels, from Alice
to Bob and Bob to Alice, respectively (Figure 1). To establish a secret key, Alice
and Bob follow the an `-round key agreement protocol, sending coded messages
over the two channels. The protocol is defined by a sequence of randomized func-
tion pairs (ΠrA, Π
r
B) for r = 1, · · · , `, and a pair of deterministic key derivation
functions (ΦA, ΦB). Each protocol function outputs a vector over alphabet sym-
bols Σ. In the ith round, Alice transmits the protocol message ci to Bob, or Bob
transmits the protocol message di to Alice. Eve reads and writes to the channel.
In the ith round, Eve reads on the set Sri and adds error on the set S
w
i , and the
sizes of Sri and S
w
i are bounded as |Sri | ≤ ρrni, |Swi | ≤ ρwni, respectively. At
the end of the ith round, Bob (or Alice) receives a corrupted word xi (or yi).
Let rA and rB denote the randomness of Alice and Bob, and v
i
A and v
i
B
denote the views of Alice and Bob, respectively. The view of Alice viA consists
of all messages received and sent by her at the end of round i− 1,
ci = ΠA(rA, v
i
A) and di = ΠB(rB , v
i
B). (3)
Fig. 1: Key Agreement Protocol over Interactive AWTP Channel
At the end of the `th round, Alice and Bob generate the keys kA and kB ,
using their sent and received messages that form their views of the protocol,
ΦA(v
`
A) = kA and ΦB(v
`
B) = kB . (4)
The key derivation algorithm is deterministic. Since there is no initial dependent
variables held by Alice and Bob, the key will only depend on the communication
transcripts.
We also consider a second case that the key derivation function outputs,
either a key or detects an error and outputs ⊥. That is,
ΦA(v
`
A) = kA and ΦB(v
`
B) = kB (5)
Security and Efficiency. The protocol has ` rounds. In the ith round of
communication, the length of the protocol message is ni protocol alphabet, where
i = 1, · · · , `. The total length of communication is n = ∑`i=1 ni.
The following gives correctness, security and reliability definitions of the key
agreement protocol.
Definition 3. (, δ)-Secure Key Agreement ((, δ)-SKA) Protocol: An (, δ)-key
agreement protocol satisfies the following properties:
1. Correctness: If Eve is passive, that is Sw = ∅, then P(KA = KB) = 1.
2. Secrecy: Let U be a uniformly distributed variable over K. For any adver-
sary view Z, the statistical distance between the distribution of key and U is
bounded by . That is,
SD(PK|Z , U) ≤  (6)
3. Strong Reliability: If the protocol key derivation function follows (4), The
probability that Alice or Bob output different keys is bounded by δ. That is,
Alice and Bob output a common key with probability at least 1− δ,
P(K = KA = KB) ≥ 1− δ (7)
4. Weak Reliability: If the protocol key derivation function follows (5), Eve wins
is if KA 6=⊥,KB 6=⊥,KA 6= KB. That is, the probability that Alice and Bob
either output error, or output the correct key, is at least 1− δ,
P(KA =⊥, or KB =⊥, or K = KA = KB) ≥ 1− δ (8)
The key agreement protocol is perfectly secure if  = 0, and perfectly reliable
if δ = 0.
The transmission efficiency of a key agreement protocol is measured by the
secret rate RSK which is the rate at which a secret key is agreed between Alice
and Bob, assuming the adversary uses their best possible adversarial strategies.
For a protocol with total transcript length n the secret key rate is given by,
log |K|
n log |Σ| .
The rate of key agreement protocol is the maximum rate of key that Alice
and Bob can generate by communicating over AWTP channel. A key agreement
is parameterd with the total length n of protocol.
Definition 4. The rate RSK of key agreement protocol is achievable for protocol
SK = {ΠrA, ΠrR} for r = 1, · · · , `, if for any ξ > 0, there exist n0 such that for
any n ≥ n0, there is
log |K|
n log |Σ| ≥ RSK − ξ
and,
δ < ξ
The -secret key capacity CSK of key agreement protocol is the largest achiev-
able rate of all key agreement protocol over the channel with -secrecy. The per-
fect secret key capacity C0SK is the largest achievable secret key rate of all key
agreement protocols over the channel.
The computational efficiency of a key agreement protocol refers to the com-
putational complexity of the protocol algorithms run by Alice and Bob. The key
agreement protocol is efficient if both parties computations are polynomial time.
Otherwise, the key agreement protocol is inefficient.
Key Agreement Protocol over AWTP-PD Channels
To better compare and contrast our results with the known results in key agree-
ment, and in particular Maurer’s setting in [25,26], we will consider a setting
where Alice and Bob have access to a one-way (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel, and a
two-way PD channel. They will use the (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel to establish de-
pendent and partially leaked variables, and then use the PD channel to extract
the entropy captured in the established dependent variables.
There is a one-way AWTP channel from Alice to Bob, and two-way PD
channels between Alice and Bob (Figure 2). To establish a secret key, Alice and
Bob follow an ` round key agreement protocol. In the first round of the key
agreement protocol, Alice sends a sequence of variables Xn to Bob over the
(ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel. In the following rounds, Alice and Bob communicate
over the PD channel.
Fig. 2: Key Agreement Protocol over AWTP-PD Channel
Description of the protocol messages and key derivation functions, and the
definitions of correctness, security and reliability are the same as the interactive
case above. The only difference is that the (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel is used only
in the first round.
In the first round of the protocol, Eve reads on the set Sr, and adds error on
the set Sw of the (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel and we have |Sr| ≤ ρrn1, |Sw| ≤ ρwn1.
At the end of the first round, Bob receives a corrupted word x1, and Eve has
the selected partial view given by z1. In the following rounds, communication is
over PD and is fully accessible to Eve. This means that in the ith round of the
protocol with i ≥ 2, Eve read and write sets are Sr = [ni] and Sw = ∅, with
|Sr| ≤ ni and |Sw| = 0. That is at the end of ith round, i ≥ 2, Bob or Alice
correctly receives the sent codeword.
3 Rate Bounds
We derive upper bounds on the secret key rate of key agreement protocols over
(ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel.
3.1 Interactive key agreement
This is the main setting considered in this paper. The only resource available
to the adversary is the channel that is partially controlled by the adversary. We
consider strong reliability.
Theorem 1. The upper bound on the secret key rate of an interactive key agree-
ment protocol over a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel, is RSK ≤ 1− ρ. The bound is for
strong reliability.
Proof. We assume the protocol has ` rounds. The length of the protocol message
in the ith invocation of the AWTP channel is ni, and [n] =
⋃`
i=1[ni]. For the
ith communication round, let ci and di be the codewords sent by Alice and
Bob, respectively; ci,j and di,j denote the j
th components of codeword ci and
di, respectively; c
i and di denote concatenations of all codewords sent in all
invocations up to, and including, the ith round transmission. We use capital
letters to refer to the random variables associated with, ci, di, ci,j , di,j , c
i and
di, as Ci, Di, Ci,j , Di,j , C
i and Di, respectively. Let C`,r, C`,w, D`,r, D`,w be
the random variables of the protocol messages on the adversarial reading sets
and writing sets. Let C`,a and D`,a be the random variables on adversarial
read only sets, C`,b and D`,b be the random variables on the adversarial read
and write sets, C`,c and D`,c be the random variables on adversarial write only
sets, C`,d and D`,d be the random variables corresponding to the sets without
adversarial corruptions, respectively. We use Xi and Yi to denote the corrupted
word received by Bob and Alice when Ci and Di are sent (by Bob and Alice,
respectively), and define similarly Xi,j , X
i and Yi,j , Y
i corresponding to Ci,j , C
i
and Di,j , D
i, respectively.
Step 1: We first define an adversary Adv1 that works as follow:
1. Selects the reading sets and writing sets in all ` rounds before the start of
the protocol.
2. During the protocol, in round i, chooses a random error vector e, and adds
it to the set Swi of that round.
3. During round i, the adversary reads the components of Sri .
Note that this adversary does not use the information seen during the protocol
to improve their chance of making the protocol to fail. We give two lemmas that
follow from secrecy and reliability.
Lemma 1. For an (, δ)-key agreement protocol, the following holds for adver-
sary Adv1:
I(K;C`,rD`,r) ≤ 4n log( |Σ|

) (9)
and,
log |K| − H(K) ≤ 4n log( |Σ|

) (10)
Proof is in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. For any (, δ)-key agreement protocol, the following holds:
H(K|C`,aC`,dD`,aD`,d) ≤ 2H(δ) + 2δ log |K| (11)
Proof is in Appendix B.
Step 2: We prove the upper bound:
log |K|
2n log |Σ| ≤ 1− ρ+ 2(1 + log|Σ
1

)
We have,
H(K) = I(K;C`,aC`,bD`,aD`,b) + H(K|C`,aC`,bD`,aD`,b). (12)
The first item I(K;C`,aC`,bD`,aD`,b) is upper bounded using Lemma 1 (Eq.
(9)). For second item, H(K|C`,aC`,bD`,aD`,b), we have,
H(K|C`,aC`,bD`,aD`,b)
= H(KC`,bD`,b|C`,aD`,a)− H(C`,bD`,b|C`,aD`,a)
= H(K|C`,aD`,a) + H(C`,bD`,b|KC`,aD`,a)− H(C`,bD`,b|C`,aD`,a)
= H(K|C`,aD`,aC`,dD`,d) + H(C`,dD`,d|C`,aD`,a)− H(C`,dD`,d|KC`,aD`,a)
+ H(C`,bD`,b|KC`,aD`,a)− H(C`,bD`,b|C`,aD`,a)
≤ 2H(δ) + 2δ log |K|+ H(C`,dD`,d)
≤ 2H(δ) + 2δ log |K|+ (1− ρ)2n log |Σ|.
(13)
So the bound on H(K) is,
H(K) ≤ 4n log( |Σ|

) + 2H(δ) + 2δ log |K|+ (1− ρ)2n log |Σ|. (14)
From (Eq. (10) and (14)), and letting δ → 0 as n→∞, we have,
RSK =
log |K|
2n log |Σ| ≤ 1− ρ+ 4(1 + log|Σ|
1

). (15)
uunionsq
Weak reliability. A natural question is if the upper bound will be affected if
strong reliability is replaced by weak reliability, where the protocol success also
includes cases that Alice and/or Bob output ⊥. We prove the following theorem
using an approach similar to above. The proof is in full version of paper.
Theorem 2. The upper bound on rate of key agreement protocol with weak re-
liability over AWTP channel is bounded by RSK ≤ 1− ρr.
The bound suggests that the corrupted components of protocol messages
(corresponding to Swi ) can be detected and so the secret key rate is limited by
the leakage of the components in Sri .
3.2 Rate of Key Agreement Protocol over
AWTP-PD channel
In this setting the (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel is used to establish the initial de-
pendent variables, and the remaining construction is over a two-way PD. The
following theorem gives the upper bound on the secret key rate of key agreement
protocol in this setting. Proof strategy is similar to above and is given in the full
version of the paper.
Theorem 3. The upper bound on the secret key rate of key agreement protocol
over (ρr, ρw)-AWTP-PD channel, with strong reliability is, RSK ≤ 1− ρ.
For weak reliability the upper bound is RSK ≤ 1− ρr.
Remark 1. The rate in (ρr, ρw)-AWTP-PD does take into account the commu-
nication over the PD. This is different from Maurer’s definition [?] where PD is
free. The bound however is the same as the interactive case where all communi-
cations is over (ρr, ρw)-AWTP. This is surprising and shows that the secret key
rate could could stay the same if the channel is partially corrupted.
4 Constructions
We first introduce the building blocks that are use in our construction, and then
describe the constructions of protocols that achieve the upper bounds in Section
3.1 and 3.2.
4.1 Cryptographic primitives
Universal Hash Family
An (N,n,m)-hash family is a set F of N functions, f : X → T , f ∈ F , where
|X | = n and |T | = m. Without loss of generality, we assume n ≥ m.
Definition 5. [36] Suppose the range T of an (N,n,m)-hash family F is an
additive Abelian group. F is called -∆ universal, if for any two elements x1, x2 ∈
X , x1 6= x2,, and for any element t ∈ T , there are at most N functions f ∈ F
such that f(x1)− f(x2) = t, were the operation is from the group.
Let q be a prime and u ≤ q − 1. Let the message be x = {x1, · · · , xu}. For
α ∈ Fq, define the universal hash function hashα by the rule,
t = hashα(x) = x1α+ x2α
2 + · · ·+ xuαu mod q (16)
Then {hashα(·) : α ∈ Fq} is a uq -∆ universal (q, qu, q)-hash family. This is a
known construction of uq -universal hash family [36].
Message Authentication Code
A message authentication code (MAC)[35] is a cryptographic primitive that al-
lows a sender who shares a secret key with the receiver to construct authenticated
messages to be sent over a channel that is tampered by an adversary, and the
receiver to be able to verify the integrity of the received message.
Definition 6. A message authentication code consists of two algorithms (MAC,Ver)
that are used for authetication and verification, respectively. For a message m
an authentication tag, or simply a tag, is computed,
t = MAC(m, r),
and a tagged message (m, t) is constructed. The verifier accepts a tagged pair
(m, t) if Ver((m, t), r)) = 1. Security of a one-time MAC is defined as,
Pr[(m′, t′),Ver((m′, t′), r) = 1|(m, t), t = MAC(m, r)] ≤ δ
We use a MAC construction that uses polynomials over Fq. Let m be a vector
of length `, and r = (α, β), t is over Fq. Define the MAC generation function
MAC : F`q × F2q → Fq, where t = MAC(m, (α, β)) as,
t = MAC(m, (α, β)) =
`−1∑
i=0
xiα
i + β mod q.
Lemma 3. For the MAC construction above, the success probability of the ad-
versary in forging a tagged message (m′, t′) that pass MAC verification is no
more than `q .
The proof is a direct extension of the proof in [22].
Algebraic Manipulation Detection Code
Algebraic manipulation detection code (AMD code) [8] can be used to encode a
source into a value stored on Σ(G) so that any tampering by an adversary will
be detected, except with a small error probability δ.
Definition 7 (AMD Code [8] ). Let G be an additive group. An (X ,G, δ)-
Algebraic Manipulation Detection code ((X ,G, δ)-AMD code) consists of two al-
gorithms (AMDenc and AMDdec) that are used for encoding and decoding, re-
spectively. Encoding is a probabilistic mapping AMDenc : X → G that maps an
element of X to an element of the group G. Decoding is a deterministic mapping
AMDdec : G → X ∪ {⊥} and for any x ∈ X satisfies AMDdec(AMDenc(x)) = x.
The security of AMD codes requires,
P[AMDdec(AMDenc(x) +∆) 6∈ {x,⊥}] ≤ δ, (17)
for all x ∈ X , ∆ ∈ G.
An AMD code is systematic if the encoding has the form AMDenc : X →
X ×G1×G2, mapping x to (x, r, t = f(x, r)) for some function f , where r $← G1.
The decoding function outputs AMDdec(x, r, t) = x if and only if t = f(x, r),
and ⊥ otherwise.
We use a systematic AMD code, given in [8], over an extension field. Let d
be an integer such that d+2 is not divisible by q. Define the encoding AMDenc :
Fdq → Fdq × Fq × Fq as AMDenc(x) = (x, r, f(x, r)), where:
f(x, r) =
(
rd+2 +
d∑
i=1
xir
i
)
mod q. (18)
Lemma 4. For the AMD code above, the success chance of an adversary in tam-
pering with a stored codeword (x, r, t) and constructing a new codeword (x′, r′, t′) =
(x′ = x + ∆x, r′ = r + ∆r, t′ = t + ∆t), that satisfies t′ = f(x′, r′), is no more
than d+1q .
Randomness Extractor
A randomness extractor is a function, which is applied to a weakly random
entropy source (i.e., a non-uniform random variable), to obtain a uniformly dis-
tributed source.
Definition 8. [10] A (seeded) (n,m, r, δ)-strong extractor is a function Ext :
qn × qd → qm such that for any source X with H∞(X) ≥ r, we have
SD((Ext(X,Seed),Seed), (U,Seed)) ≤ δ
with the Seed uniformly distributed over Fdq .
A function Ext : qn → qm is a (seedless) (n,m, r, δ)-extractor if for any
source X with H∞(X) ≥ r, the distribution Ext(X) satisfies SD(Ext(X), U) ≤ δ.
A seedless extractor can be constructed from Reed-Solomon (RS) codes [6].
The construction works only for a restricted class of sources, known as symbol-
fixing sources.
Definition 9. An (n,m) symbol-fixing source is a tuple of independent random
variables X = (X1, · · · , Xn), defined over a set Ω, such that m of the variables
take values uniformly and independently from Ω, and the remaining variables
have fixed values.
We show a construction of a seedless (n,m,m log q, 0)-extractor from RS-
codes. Let q ≥ n+m. Consider an (n,m) symbol-fixing source X = (X1, · · · , Xn) ∈
Fnq with H∞(X) ≥ m log q. The extraction has two steps:
1. Construct a polynomial f(x) ∈ Fq[X] of degree ≤ n− 1, such that f(i) = xi
for i = 0, · · · , n− 1.
2. Evaluate the polynomial at i = {n, · · · , n+m− 1}. That is,
Ext(x) = (f(n), f(n+ 1), · · · , f(n+m− 1))
Limited-View Adversary Code
Limited-view adversary codes provide reliable communication over an (ρr, ρw)-
AWTP. [32,42].
Definition 10. An (n, k, δ)-Limited-View Adversary Code (or (n, k, δ)-LV ad-
versary code) for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel, is a code of dimension k and length
n. Encoding and decoding algorithms are (LVACenc, LVACdec). The probability
that the receiver output a message m′ 6= m, is bounded by δ. That is for any
m ∈M, and adversary’s observation z we have,
P(LVACdec(LVACenc(m) + Adv(z)) 6= m) ≤ δ.
LV adversary codes provide reliable communication over AWTP channels.
Previous constructions achieves capacity 1− ρw [42,33], but with the condition
that ρr + ρw < 1. In Appendix C we give a simple construction of LV adversary
code with low rate of communication, but get rid of the restriction ρr + ρw < 1
(Appendix C). Security of this construction is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4. The LV adversary code has rate RLV = 1 + ρ − ρr − 2ρw over
(ρr, ρw, ρ)-AWTP channel. The probability of error for a length n code is δ ≤ unq .
The computation is polynomial in code length n.
4.2 Interactive Key Agreement Protocol with
Strong Reliability
We introduce a three round interactive protocol with strong reliability, over
AWTP channel. The idea behind the protocol is as follows. In the first transmis-
sion round, Alice sends a sequence of randomly selected components to Bob. The
adversary reads over a set Sr1 , and adds errors on a S
w
1 . Bob receives a vector
that is partially corrupted and partially leaked to the adversary. In the second
round, Bob generates a key for each component, and uses a MAC algorithm to
construct a tag for each component, using its ow attached key. The keys and
tag pairs are sent to Alice using an LV-code and so are received correctly by
Alice who will use the received key and tag pair to check the correctness of the
ith component. In the key derivation step, Alice and Bob use a randomness ex-
tractor to generate a shared key from their shared randomness which is partially
leaked to the adversary.
The construction of secure key agreement protocol uses universal hash func-
tion, seedless random extractor, and LV adversary code. Let n1, n2, n3 be the
length of the protocol messages sent by Alice and Bob in each round. The total
communication length is n = n1 +n2 +n3. Let the protocol be over Fuq . We use:
1). the uq -∆ universal (q, q
u−1, q)-hash family; 2). the seedless (un1, `, ` log q, 0)-
extractor; 3). the (n, k, δ)-LV adversary code with k = 2n1u , n =
k
RLV
, δ ≤ un1q
over alphabet Σ = Fuq .
Theorem 5. The key agreement protocol has rate RSK = 1 − ρ − ξ when ρr +
2ρw < 1 + ρ, over AWTP channel. The alphabet size is |Σ| = O(q 1ξ ). The key
agreement protocol is perfectly secure and the decoding error is bounded by δ ≤ ξ.
The number of round is three. The computation complexity is O((n log q)2).
The secure key agreement protocol is given in Figure 4.2.
Fig 4.2. Secure Key Agreement Protocol over AWTP channel
1. R1: Alice
AWTP−→ Bob. For each i ∈ n1, Alice chooses a vector ri that
is uniformly distributed over Fu−1q , and βi over Fq. Alice sends over
the forward AWTP channel to Bob, the codeword c1 = (c1,1, · · · , c1,n1)
where c1,i = (ri, βi).
2. R2: Bob
AWTP−→ Alice. Bob receives x1 = (x1,1, · · · , x1,n1) with x1,i =
(r′i, β
′
i) fand generates a vector of random values (α1, · · · , αn1) over Fq.
Bob generates t = (t1, · · · , tn1) over Fq such that,
ti = MAC(r
′
i, αi) + β
′
i mod q, for i = 1, · · · , n1. (19)
Bob encodes (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1) into LV adversary code d2 over
Fuq . Bob sends the codeword d2 over backward AWTP channel to Alice.
3. R3: Alice
AWTP−→ Bob. Alice receives y2, and decode into
(α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1) using LV adversary code decoding algo-
rithm. For each i = 1 · · ·n1, Alice checks if,
ti
?
= MAC(ri, αi) + βi mod q. (20)
Alice generates a binary vector (v1, · · · , vn1) where vi = 1 if (ri, βi) pass
the authentication test, and vi = 0 if not. Alice encodes (v1, · · · , vn1)
into an LV adversary code c3, and sends it over the forward AWTP
channel to Bob.
4. Key Derivation. Alice and Bob use a key derivation algorithm to generate
secret key.
– Alice generates a vector (s1, · · · , sn1) with si = ri if vi = 1, si = 0 if
vi = 0 for i,= 1 · · · , n1. Alice generates a key kA using randomness
extractor,
kA = Ext(s1, · · · , sn1) (21)
– Bob receives x3 from Alice, and decodes it into (v1, · · · , vn1) us-
ing LV adversary code decoding algorithm. Bob generates a vector
(s′1, · · · , s′n1) with s′i = r′i if vi = 1, s′i = 0 if vi = 0 for i,= 1, · · · , n1.
Finally Bob uses the extractor to generate a security key,
kB = Ext(s
′
1 · · · , s′n1) (22)
Secrecy and Reliability
Let the secret key k = kA. We will show that the probability that Alice
and Bob output different keys is bound by δ; that is P(K = KA 6= KB) ≤ δ.
Moreover and the distribution of the secret key given the adversary’s observation,
is uniform, that is SD(PK|Z , U) = SD(PKA|Z , U) = 0.
Lemma 5. The probability that Alice and Bob do not output the same key is
bounded by δ ≤ unq if ρr + 2ρw ≤ 1 + ρ.
Proof. First we consider the case ρr+2ρw ≥ 1+ρ. If ρr+2ρw ≥ 1+ρ, we can not
use the LV adversary code to transmit messages (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1) and
(v1, · · · , vn1) reliably to the other party, respectively. This is because the rate of
LV adversary code RLV = 1 + ρw − ρr − 2ρw. If ρr + 2ρw ≥ 1 + ρ, the rate of LV
adversary code RLV ≤ 0. Alice and Bob can not receive (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1)
and (v1, · · · , vn1) except with negligible error. So the Alice and Bob can not gen-
erate secret key using key agreement protocol with negligible error probability.
Then we consider the case ρr + 2ρw ≤ 1 + ρ. The secret key generated by
Alice not equal to Bob happens in two cases:
1. Alice and Bob decode the correct message (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1), and
(v1, · · · , vn1) from y2 and x3, respectively, using LV adversary code decoding
algorithm, except with probability at most δ1 ≤ u(n2+n3)q .
This is because (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1), and (v1, · · · , vn1) are encoded by
LV adversary code. Since ρr+2ρw ≤ 1+ρ, the message (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1),
and (v1, · · · , vn1) can be encoded by LV adversary code with rate RLV > 0.
From Theorem 4, the probability that receiver (Alice or Bob) does not
output the correct messages (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1), and (v1, · · · , vn1) are
bounded by un2q and
un3
q , respectively. So both parties outputs correct mes-
sage from y2 and x3, except with probability at most
u(n2+n3)
q .
2. Given Alice and Bob share the same (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1) and (v1, · · · , vn1),
the two parties will generate common randomness (s1, · · · , sn1) = (s′1, · · · , s′n1),
except with probability at most δ2 ≤ un1q .
This is from,
P((s1, · · · , sn1) 6= (s′1, · · · , s′n1))
≤
n1∑
i=1
P(si 6= s′i)
=
n1∑
i=1
P(si 6= s′i, vi = 1)
≤
n1∑
i=1
P(ri 6= r′i and MAC(ri, αi)−MAC(r′i, αi) = β′i − βi)
≤ un1
q
(23)
Since the secret key kA and kB are extracted from randomness (s1, · · · , sn1)
and (s′1, · · · , s′n1), the probability that Alice and Bob generate same secret key
such that kA = kB , is bounded by,
1− δ = P(K = KA = KB)
= P
(
LVACdec(y2) = (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1) and LVACdec(x3) = (v1, · · · , vn1)
and (s1, · · · , sn1) = (s′1, · · · , s′n1)
)
= P
(
LVACdec(y2) = (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1) and LVACdec(x3) = (v1, · · · , vn1)
)
P
(
(s1, · · · , sn1) = (s′1, · · · , s′n1) | LVACdec(y2) = (α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1)
and LVACdec(x3) = (v1, · · · , vn1)
)
≥ (1− δ1)(1− δ2) ≥ (1− u(n2 + n3)
q
)(1− un1
q
)
≥ 1− u(n2 + n3)
q
− un1
q
= 1− un
q
(24)
So it implies the reliability of key agreement protocol is bounded by δ ≤ unq .
Lemma 6. The key agreement protocol has perfectly secrecy if ` ≤ (u− 1)(1−
ρ)n1
Proof. To show the prefect security of key agreement protocol, we assume the
adversary reads on the last ρrn1 fraction of codeword. The general adversary
attacking can be proved similarly.
First, the vector (r1, · · · , r(1−ρr)n1) is perfectly secure for any adversary’s
observation z. Since adversary reads ρr fraction of codeword in first round, and
read the message encoded by LV adversary code in the second and third, the
adversary’s observation is no more than the following set of components,
Z =
{
r(1−ρr)n1+1 · · · rn1 , β(1−ρr)n1+1 · · ·βn1 , α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1 , v1, · · · , vn1
}
(25)
For the set of components
{
r1, · · · , r(1−ρr)n1
}
, it is perfectly secure for any
adversary’s observation. It implies the vector (r1, · · · , r(1−ρr)n1) has min-entropy
at least ` log q.
Second, since vector (s1, · · · , sn1) is generated from (r1, · · · , rn1), which has
min-entropy at least ` log q, it implies (s1, · · · , sn1) also has min-entropy at least
` log q.
Finally, since the kA is generated from (s1, · · · , sn1) using randomness ex-
tractor, and (s1, · · · , sn1) is (n1, `) symbol-fixing source, it implies the secret key
SD(KA|Z) = SD(U).
uunionsq
Rate of Key Agreement Protocol
Lemma 7. The rate of key agreement protocol approaches RSK = 1− ρ.
Proof. For a small ξ ≥ 0, let the parameter be chosen as u ≥ 1ξ + 4ξRLV , q ≥ 2un2,
` = (u − 1)(1 − ρ)n1, n0 ≥ u, and Σ = Fuq . Let RSK = 1 − ρ. For any n ≥ n0,
the rate of secure key agreement protocol family is given by,
log |K|
n log |Σ| =
` log q
un log q
=
(u− 1)(1− ρ)n1 log q
(n1 + n2 + n3)u log q
=
(u− 1)(1− ρ)n1 log q
(n1 +
2n1
uRLV
+ 2n1uRLV )u log q
=
u− 1
u+ 4RLV
(1− ρ)
≥ 1− ρ− ξ = RSK − ξ
(26)
The decoding error probability is bounded by,
δ ≤ un
q
≤ 1
2n
≤ ξ (27)
From Definition 4, the rate of secure key agreement is RSK = 1− ρ.
4.3 An SKA Protocol with Strong Reliability
over AWTP-PD Channel
We introduce the key agreement protocol with strong reliability over AWTP-PD
channel. Both AWTP channel and pubic discussion is over alphabet Σ = Fuq ,
where q is a prime, and u is an integer. The key agreement protocol has three
rounds, uses AWTP channel once and teh public discussion channel twice.
The construction of key agreement protocol is similar to the key agree-
ment protocol over AWTP channel (Fig 4.2). Since the communication is over
PD channel, after the first round of the protocol, Bob can directly transmit
(α1, · · · , αn1 , t1, · · · , tn1) to Alice in the second round, and Alice can also directly
transmit (v1, · · · , vn1) to Bob in the third round, without using LV adversary
code. The difference between key agreement protocol over AWTP-PD channel
and key agreement protocol over interactive AWTP channel is that messages are
directly transmitted in the second and third round of the protocol. This means
that the condition ρr + 2ρw < 1 + ρ that was imposed by the LV-code will not
be required.
Theorem 6. The key agreement protocol has rate RSK = 1− ρ− ξ over trans-
mission alphabet for the AWTP channel is of size |Σ| = O(q 1ξ ), The computation
complexity is O((n log q)2).
Proof is in the full version of the paper. It is omitted because f space.
4.4 An SKA Protocol with weak relaibility
We consider weak reliability. The key agreement protocol is one round.
The construction uses AMD codes and randomness extractors. The proof is
in the full version of the paper.
Theorem 7. The key agreement protocol in 4.4 has one round over AWTP
channel, and achieves rate RSK = 1− ρr. The alphabet size is |Σ| = O(q 1ξ ). The
protocol has polynomial time computation.
Fig. 4.4 Secure Key Agreement Protocol with Weak Reliability.
Alice does the following:
1. Chooses a vector s = (s1, · · · , sn), that is uniformly distributed over
Fu−2q .
2. Chooses a vector (r1, · · · , rn) that is uniformly distributed over Fq, and
generates (t1, · · · , tn) using AMD code (Eq 18),
ti = f(s, ri) mod q (28)
3. Sends the codeword c = (c1, · · · , cn) over Fuq with ci = (si, ri, ti), to Bob
over AWTP channel.
4. Alice generate kA using randomness extractor.
kA = Ext(s1, · · · , sn1) (29)
Bob does the following:
1. Receives the word x = (x1, · · · , xn) with xi = (s′i, r′i, t′i) and checks if x
is tampered by Eve by checking:
t′i
?
= f(s′, r′i) (30)
2. Output ⊥ if x is tampered by Eve. Otherwise, Bob generates kB using
randomness extractor.
kB = Ext(s
′
1, · · · , s′n1) (31)
The above protocol shows that under weak reliability, very efficient key agree-
ment protocols can be constructed.
5 Concluding remarks
We motivated and defined a new setting for key agreement protocols where the
adversary partially controls the communication channel, and interaction over
this channel is the only resource of the adversary. Previous works had considered
the cases that the channel was fully authenticated, or fully corrupted. In such
a setting channel by itself cannot be the only resource for establishing a secret
shared key: in the former case no secrecy for the can be provided, and in the
latter no guarantee on communication. All protocols in these settings assume
prior dependent variables as communicants’ resource for establishing a shared
key. In our setting, the limited control of the adversary makes the channel a
resource for extracting a shared key. We formalized the model, derived the secret
key rate bounds, and gave constructions that achieve the bounds.
There are numerous open questions that follow form this work. First and
foremost, construction of protocols for small alphabets. Our constructions al-
though have constant size alphabet, but the alphabet size depends on how close
the rate of the protocol is to the upper bound. The alphabet size determines
granularity of the physical layer adversaries. In network setting, each compo-
nent of a protocol message (codeword) will be sent over a path and so larger size
alphabets could be acceptable. In wireless communication however, the alphabet
size must be reduced.
Secondly, we defined leakage and corruption as constant ratios of the trans-
mitted word. One can consider other measures of leakage and corruption to limit
the adversary’s power.
Thirdly, we motivated the use of physical layer properties of communication
systems for providing security against massive surveillance systems. We showed
partially controlled physical environments can be used to establish shared secret
keys between two participants. Designing other cryptographic primitives that
use partial access of the adversary to the physical resources of a system is an
interesting direction for future work.
Finally, the three round protocol in Section 4.2 has the requirement ρr +
2ρw ≤ 1 + ρ among parameters. Achieving the bound without this requirement,
and finding the minimum number of rounds for protocols with similar property
(achieve the upper bound), are open problems.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. 1). First, we show I(K;C`,rD`,r) ≤ 4n log( |Σ| ).
The proof uses Pinsker’s Lemma:
Lemma 8. Let P , Q be probability distributions. Let SD(P,Q) ≤ . Then
H(P )− H(Q) ≤ 2 · log( |P ∪Q|

)
From the definition of secrecy of key agreement (Eq. (6)), we have,
SD(PK|Z , U) ≤ 
From Pinsker’s lemma and adversarial reading sets Z = (C`,rD`,r), it implies,
H(U)− H(K|C`,rD`,r) ≤ 2 · log( |K|

) (32)
Since U is the uniform distribution overK, it implies, H(K) ≤ log |K| = H(U).
Since Alice and Bob’s randomness rA and rB are not correlated, it implies |K| ≤
|Σ|2n. So there is,
I(K;C`,rD`,r) ≤ H(K)− H(K|C`,rD`,r)
≤ H(U)− H(K|C`,rD`,r)
≤ 2 · log( |K|

)
≤ 4n log( |Σ|

)
(33)
2). Second, we show log |K| − H(K) ≤ 2 · log( |K| ).
From H(K|C`,rD`,r) ≤ H(K) ≤ log |K|, H(U) = log |K|, and (Eq. 32 and 33),
it implies,
log |K| − H(K) ≤ 4n log( |Σ|

) (34)
uunionsq
B Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. From the definition of reliability (Eq. (9)), the probability that Bob out-
puts the wrong key is bounded as follow,
Pr(KA 6= K) ≤ δ and Pr(KB 6= K) ≤ δ (35)
From Fano’s lemma and (Eq. 35), it implies,
H(K|C`Y `) = H(K|KA) ≤ H(δ) + δ log |K| (36)
and,
H(K|D`X`) ≤ H(K|KB) ≤ H(δ) + δ log |K| (37)
Since C`,a = X`,a, C`,d = X`,d, D`,a = Y `,a, D`,d = Y `,d, it implies,
H(K|C`,aC`,bC`,cC`,dD`,aY `,bY `,cD`,d) ≤ H(δ) + δ log |K| (38)
and,
H(K|D`,aD`,bD`,cD`,dC`,aX`,bX`,cC`,d) ≤ H(δ) + δ log |K| (39)
From,
H(KD`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d)
= H(K|D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,cD`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d) + H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d)
= H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dK) + H(K|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d)
(40)
it implies,
H(K|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d)
≤ H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d)− H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dK)
+ H(δ) + δ log |K|
(41)
From,
H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dC`,bC`,cY `,bY `,c)
= H(K|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dC`,bC`,cY `,bY `,c)
+ H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dC`,bC`,cY `,bY `,cK)
− H(K|D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,cD`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dC`,bC`,cY `,bY `,c)
≤ H(K|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dC`,bC`,cY `,bY `,c)
+ H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dC`,bC`,cY `,bY `,cK)
(1)
≤ H(δ) + δ log |K|+ H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dK)
(42)
Here (1) is from (Eq. 38), and,
H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dC`,bC`,cY `,bY `,cK)
≤ H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dK), (43)
It implies,
H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dC`,bC`,cY `,bY `,c)
≤ H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dK) + H(δ) + δ log |K| (44)
From (Eq. 41 and 44), it implies,
H(K|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d)
≤ H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d)
− H(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,dC`,bC`,cY `,bY `,c) + 2H(δ) + 2δ log |K|
= I(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c;C`,bC`,cY `,bY `,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d) + 2H(δ) + 2δ log |K|
(45)
From adv1, since (X
`,b, X`,c) = (C`,b, C`,c) + (E`,b, E`,c) and (Y `,b, Y `,c) =
(D`,b, D`,c) + (E′`,b, E′`,c), it implies,
I(D`,bD`,cX`,bX`,c;C`,bC`,cY `,bY `,c|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d) = 0 (46)
From (Eq. 45 and 46) it implies,
H(K|D`,aD`,dC`,aC`,d) ≤ 2H(δ) + 2δ log |K|
uunionsq
C LV Adversary Code
The construction of LV adversary code use the algebraic manipulation detection
code (AMD code).
LV adversary code Construction
The construction of LV adversary code achieves reliable communication over LV
adversary channel (or AWTP channel), even with the condition of ρr + ρw ≥ 1.
The idea of LV adversary code construction is that sender first encode the mes-
sage using Reed-Solomon code. Then for each components of Reed-Solomon code,
sender uses AMD code to authentication each component. When the receiver re-
ceives the LV adversary code, for each components the receiver uses AMD code
verification algorithm to check whether the components has been tampered by
adversary or not. For the components of LV adversary code that adversary only
write, there is high chance to detect the error. For the rest of components of code-
word, the receiver use the Reed-Solomon code decoding algorithm to output the
correct message.
Let the message of LV adversary code has length `. The length of LV adver-
sary code is n. The LV adversary code is over Fuq . To construct LV adversary code,
we use (`, n)-Reed-Solomon code over Fu−2q , and (Fu−2q ,Fuq , d+1q )-AMD code. The
encoding algorithm is in Figure C, and decoding algorithm is in Figure C.
Fig.C. LV adversary code Encoding algorithm
1. Step1: For message m, the sender encodes the message into Reed-
Solomon code cRS.
2. Step2: For each component ci for i = 1, · · · , n, the sender encodes ci
into AMD code (ci, ri, ti).
The LV adversary can read on set Sr and add error on set Sw. The receiver
receives corrupted word y.
Fig.C. LV adversary code Decoding algorithm
1. Step1: For each component yi = (c
′
i, r
′
i, t
′
i) for i = 1, · · · , n, the receiver
uses AMD code verification algorithm to check if the AMD code is valid,
that is t′i
?
= f(c′i, r
′
i).
2. Step2: The receiver discard the error components. For the rest compo-
nents passing the AMD code verification algorithm, the receiver uses
Reed-Solomon code decoding algorithm to output the message m.
We show the rate of the LV adversary code.
Theorem 8. The LV adversary code achieves rate R = 1 − ρr − 2ρw + ρ over
(ρr, ρw, ρ)-AWTP channel, except with error probability δ ≤ unq , in Poly(n).
Proof. We denote the components |Sr ∩Sw| = ρ0n. Since |Sr ∩Sw|+ |Sr ∪Sw| =
|Sr|+ |Sw|, it implies, ρ0 + ρ = ρr + ρw.
The components of codeword can be divided into four categories: not cor-
rupted, read only, read and write, write only.
For the write only components (ci, ri, ti), since the adversary does not know
the AMD code (ci, ri, ti), the probability that adversary tampered AMD code
(c′i, r
′
i, t
′
i) passes verification is bounded by
u
q . Since there are at most n write
only components, the probability of any writing only components pass AMD
code verification algorithm is bounded by unq .
For the rest components including not corrupted, read only, read and write
components, the length of codeword is n′ = n− (ρw − ρ0)n. Since the length of
error is ρ0n, the receiver can uniquely output the correct message if the length
of message ` ≤ n′ − 2ρ0n. So the rate of codeword is bounded as follow,
R ≤ `
n
=
n′ − 2ρ0n
n
= 1− (ρw − ρ0)− 2ρ0
= 1− ρw − ρ0 = 1 + ρ− ρr − 2ρw
(47)
D Relation Between Upper Bound of Key
Agreement
We show the relation between the upper bound of key agreement [23] in which
Alice and Bob generate key using public discussion from the shared triple variable
with distribution PXY Z , and key agreement over AWTP-PD channel.
Lemma 9. The rate of key agreement is RSK ≤ 1n log |Σ| min(I(Xn;Y n), I(Xn;Y n|Zn)).
The relation between mutual information entropy and reading and writing param-
eters (ρr, ρw) of adversary wiretap channel are I(X
n;Y n|Zn) = (1− ρ)n log |Σ|
and I(Xn;Y n) ≤ (1 − ρw)n log |Σ|. So the rate of key agreement protocol is
bounded by RSK ≤ 1− ρ.
Proof. We assume that Eve reads on the Sr components of (X1, · · · , Xn) with
|Sr| = ρrn, and add random error on the Sw components of codeword with
|Sw| = ρwn. The components that adversary either read or write is S = Sr ∪Sw
with |S| = ρn.
First, from Theorem 4 [26], the rate of key agreement protocolRSK is bounded
by,
RSK ≤ 1
n log |Σ| min(I(X
n;Y n), I(Xn;Y n|Zn))
Second, we show that I(Xn;Y n) ≤ (1− ρw)n log |Σ|.
We have,
H(Y n|Xn) = H(En|Xn) = H(En) = ρwn log |Σ|
So,
I(Xn;Y n) = H(Y n)− H(Y n|Xn) ≤ n log |Σ| − ρwn log |Σ|
= (n− ρwn) log |Σ|
Third, we show that I(Xn;Y n|Zn) ≤ (1− ρ)n log |Σ|. Let Zn be the random
variable that adversary does not read. Since Zn is equal to Xn on set Sr, and
zero on [n]/Sr, it implies Z
n
is equal to Xn on set [n]/Sr, and zero on Sr. So
there is X = Z + Z. We have,
I(Xn;Y n|Zn) = H(Xn|Zn)− H(Xn|Y n, Zn)
= H(Xn, Zn)− H(Zn)− (H(Xn, Y n, Zn)− H(Y n, Zn))
= H(Y n|Zn)− H(Y n|Xn)
= H(Xn + En|Zn)− ρwn log |Σ|
= H(Z
n
+ Zn + En|Zn)− ρwn log |Σ|
≤ H(Zn + En)− ρwn log |Σ|
≤ (n− (ρ− ρw)n) log |Σ| − ρwn log |Σ|
= (1− ρ)n log |Σ|
uunionsq
